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THE WORLD OF EUROPEAN INFORMATION 
AN INSTITUTIONAL AND RELATIONAL 
GENESIS OF THE EU PUBLIC SPHERE 
Philippe ALDRIN* 
 
either the EU communication policy nor the criticism it is 
subject to are new. Born with the integration process itself, the 
question of Community communication can be traced back to 
the 1950s, when the High Authority sought to develop the ‘public 
relations’ of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community)1. A first 
report by the European Parliament devoted to the ‘information 
problem’ of the European community project was published in the 
1950s (Carboni, 1957). Although this question was from the inception 
an important issue in inter-institutional debates (the Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted resolutions on the information-communication 
policy in 1960, 1962, 1972 and 1986), it was only from the 1980s 
onwards that information-communication policy became the subject of 
recurrent controversy, particularly around the themes relative to the 
excessive power of the Commission and the ‘democratic deficit’ of 
Europe – until then synonymous with parliamentary impotence 
                                                             
(*) Professor at Sciences Po Aix / CHERPA. 
1  In 1955, the High Authority commissioned Brose and Elvinger, a professional agency, to 
produce a report on the development of ‘public relations’ (Brose, Elvinger, 1955). 
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(Marquand, 1979). Sporadically, crisis after crisis, and controversy after 
controversy, the paradigms on which the conceptual frameworks of 
European Communication were based shifted. First of all, the 
‘challenges’ facing European leaders in terms of opinion and the media 
were not the same in 1952 as they were in 1992 or today. From the end 
of the 1990s onwards, the diffusionist approach to communication that 
prevailed in the first decades of the European project, based on a 
pedagogy instrumentalizing ‘opinion makers’ as relays of information 
(Aldrin, 2009), progressively lost ground to a more procedural 
conception on the one hand where communication, integrated 
upstream of policy formulation, mobilized dialogue and on deliberative 
democracy mechanisms on the other hand seeking to give substance to 
the ‘governance’ framework (Georgakakis, De Lassalle, 2007a)2. 
But how can one better understand, beyond this paradigmatic shift, the 
concrete functioning of and transformations in European 
communication? On this question, the academic literature contains a 
peculiar bias. Most authors start from the end of the process and focus 
on the effects of the EU's communication policy and, ultimately, on its 
supposed inefficiency, in order to identify the causes. Attempting to 
diagnose Europe's inability to address the communication ‘challenge’, 
observers tend to focus on identifying the ‘strategic errors’ that could 
explain its ‘failure’ (Dacheux, 2004). Though the inventory of 
arguments characterizing the successive controversies in the history of 
EU communication policy probably predisposes to such an 
interpretation, a more structural approach can help shed some light on 
the institutionally and sociologically roots of the ‘problem’3. 
To do so, one must first take into account the transformations resulting 
from the successive political changes in the European community. With 
the direct elections of MEPs4, citizen behaviour and opinions – 
measured with regular opinion polls (Eurobarometer) – have 
                                                             
2 We must put this evolution in perspective and highlight the permanence, in EU institutions, 
of the diffusionist paradigm, through the continued existence of the four hundred ‘Europe 
Direct’ centers housed by the various partners (universities, local authorities, chambers of 
commerce). 
3 In a sense close to the program defined by F. Bailey: ‘We are looking for a level of 
knowledge of the game which those that play it might not have. It is that which the 
anthropologist or the Political science specialist seeks to reach. Until s/he gets there, all 
s/he does is describe what the players themselves know and s/he has not begun to carry 
out his/her own analysis.’ (Bailey, 1971, p.22). 
4 With, in particular, the 1976 reform introducing the election of MEPs by direct universal 
suffrage and the use of referendums for ratifying new treaties. 
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progressively become the main indicator of the EU's political 
legitimacy. Since the principles of legitimization of political Europe 
became aligned with those of any other ‘public democracy’5, each ‘crisis’ 
(low voter turnout, negative referendum) has had a magnifying effect 
on the EU's ‘communication strategy’, giving critics the opportunity to 
express themselves (Kingdon, 1984). But here too, discourses account 
only imperfectly for the reality of the situations and practices, and even 
more so for the changes in this reality. Against the impression 
generated by the steady stream of accusations made by active 
Eurosceptics, who qualify the EU communication as structurally 
dysfunctional6, the information-communication mechanism has 
undergone successive adjustments and experienced objective successes 
such as the constitution of a substantial press corps in Brussels. As 
early as Delors' first mandate, ‘information policy’ was officially 
renamed ‘European communication’. The completion of the Single 
Market and the new Treaty provisions - including EU citizenship and 
the second ‘pillar’ has partly eroded the States resistance to Brussels 
attempts to communicate its ‘propaganda’ directly to citizens (Foret, 
2008, p.63). Thus, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EU's 
information and communication policy asserted itself more openly as a 
program for the integration of national opinions, even though, as we 
shall see, this objective had been conceptualized and operationalized 
much earlier. 
But it is the ‘nature’, scope and horizon of Europe itself that have 
changed. It is now not only possible but accepted to use proactive 
rhetoric on strategic communication to serve the European project. 
The Maastricht moment, marked by voters' unexpected timidity and the 
recommendations provided in the de Clercq report7 accelerated the 
                                                             
5 In this third age of democracy, described by Bernard Manin as dominated by the mass 
media, the personalization of politics and opinion polls, ‘a new elite of communication 
specialists is replacing political activists and apparatchiks’. (Manin, 1995, p.279) 
6 Adopted by MEPs in 1986, at the threshold of a new political age galvanized by the prospect of a Single 
European Market, the Baget-Bozzo report demanded a ‘true European communication policy’ using, 
without limits, all available means and media (European Parliament, 1986). 
7 Facing new criticisms formulated or relayed by the media following the difficult ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission appointed a group of experts comprising eighty 
professionals from different fields in 1992 (journalists, academics, artists, advertisers, 
national and European civil servants). Under the chairmanship of the Belgian MEP Willy 
de Clercq, the group was given a triple mission: ‘Compile a descriptive review of the 
information and communication policies’; ‘provide a diagnosis on the quality of the 
mechanisms, actions, behaviors and means’ and ‘formulate strategic recommendations’ 
(Clercq, 1993). 
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transformation of the communication apparatus as well as the public 
justification of this transformation. Commercial communication 
techniques were used in the ‘information effort’. Marketing principles 
and terminology, as well as the figurative fictions of the general public 
(the ‘European citizen’, ‘European Youth’) became part of the 
discursive and action repertoires of the Commission (Tumber, 1995). 
For a long time considered as an artificial institutional posture aimed at 
making EU action more natural and attractive in the eyes of citizens of 
the Member States (Memmi, 1991), communication was no longer 
limited to providing information on Europe. It was embraced as a key 
instrument for political legitimization. From the 1980s onward, the EU 
agents most interested in the integration process (Commissioners, 
Spokespeople, DG X agents) and soon after, other European public 
affairs professionals (international journalists, members of think tanks, 
lobbyists, communication consultants) started investing themselves 
more openly into conquering ‘European opinion’, as the struggle to win 
the hearts and minds was constructed as the new frontier and central 
challenge of political Europe. 
To get to the root causes of the ‘problem’ behind the controversies, 
one must first examine the factors that have led, in the last decade, to a 
politicization of debates around the EU communication policy. A 
steadily declining turnout at the European Parliament elections (1999, 2004, 
2009), referendum failures (2001, 2005 and 2008), the avowed Euro-
phobia of some national governments: the frequency of ‘crises’ seems 
to have spun out of control, bringing an increase in the opportunities 
for an ever increasing number of European information specialists to 
publicly question EU policy on this topic. The Santer scandalvmarked a 
highpoint in the criticism and the beginning of a new stage in the 
institutional conception of EU communication. The dramatic collective 
resignation of the Commissioners in 1999 was almost unanimously 
considered (Meyer, 1999)8 as the consequence of the inept management 
by the Commission of its relations with the press9. Thus, as soon as he 
                                                             
8 The services in charge of the press and communication were seen as been incapable of 
coping with the media attention given to the rumors, first, and later by the public scandal 
triggered by the ‘Wise man’ report published in early 1999. This interpretation of the ‘crisis’ 
and its origins lingers on within the institutions whereas a more socio-political approach to 
these events questions if ‘strategic errors’ alone were responsible for the crisis 
(Georgakakis, 2001). 
9 Gathered in Helsinki in December 1999, the Heads of State and governments invited the 
European Commission to ‘study the general question of the Union's information policy, 
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was appointed, President Prodi promised the rapid adoption of ‘an 
information strategy’ and a complete overhaul of the incriminated 
services – the Directorate General for communication or DG X – as 
part of a comprehensive reform of the entire administrative apparatus 
(Cini, 2002). After dissolving DG X10, and setting it up again in 2001 as 
DG PRESS under parliamentary pressure11, the Prodi Commission 
adopted legislation which sought to define ‘a new framework for 
cooperation’ (European Commission, 2001b) and promote a better 
‘inter-institutional collaboration’ (European Commission 2002b) for the 
information and communication policy of the EU, in accordance with 
the governance principles theorized in the 2001 White Paper (European 
Commission, 2001b). Confronted with yet another record-low turnout 
at the European elections of 2004, the Prodi Presidency came to an end 
amidst renewed criticism of the weaknesses of EU institutional 
communication (Anderson, McLeod, 2008). As a result, the Barroso 
College, formed in 2004, appointed the Swedish Commissioner Margot 
Wallström as the first vice-president in charge of ‘institutional relations 
and communication strategy’. Her mission statement includes the 
reshaping the EU communication policy. Following the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Wallström concentrated attention on the 
‘professionalization’ of the European services (European Commission 
2005b), routinely made use of the provisions on participatory 
democracy (European Commission 2005c) and proposed, in a White 
Paper published in 2006, a ‘true break’ from existing political objectives 
and a modification of the division of labor in the field of European 
communication (European Commission 2006). The propositions put 
forward by the Commission were met with open opposition from the 
Commission's main institutional partners (European Parliament, 
2006)12. The ensuing debate, which think tanks, information sites and 
specialized agencies heavily influenced and were largely engaged in, led 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
including improving coordination with its information offices in the Member States and 
links with national information offices’. 
10 DG X is divided into two broad services: the Spokesperson Service (which inherited the 
Media and Communication Unit) and the DG for Education and culture (which inherited 
the opinion surveys and publications portfolios). Breaking with tradition, the President 
took on the ‘Media and Communication’ portfolio. 
11 This following the European Parliament's adoption, in March 2001, of a ‘resolution on the 
Information and communication strategy of the EU,’ stressing that the ‘communication 
policy of the European institutions requires urgent adjustment’, and ‘noting with concern 
that the reallocation of responsibilities in the field of information policy is considerably 
delaying the adoption of decisions in this area’. 
12 For more details on the institutional criticisms of the White Paper, (Aldrin, Utard, 2008) 
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to a compromise agreement for greater inter-agency cooperation 
(European Commission 2007; 2008a).  
Since the late 1990s, a shared diagnosis has thus ascribed the 
misfortunes of political Europe to poor management of the media and 
public opinion. From this perspective, one can get a first understanding 
of the reasons for the success of this rhetoric of the ‘insurmountable’ 
challenge and its corollaries, delay and failure. 
We do not situate our analysis within this rhetoric, or to put it 
differently, we do not use the same framework. The question of the 
relevance or effectiveness of the EU's communication policy will not be 
raised here and we shall only examine it as a belief of the actors studied. 
Rather, our approach is to attempt to analyse the process which 
constructs European communication (Rowell, Mangenot, 2010). For 
this purpose, we will endeavour to explore a world at work (Becker, 
1988), that of the professionals of European information, with its 
routines, contingencies and conflicts, in the same way as other worlds 
of Europe have been studied in their concrete reality (Georgakakis, 
2002a; Michel, 2005; other chapters in this volume). When one 
distances oneself from institutional discourses or from media products 
to conduct the sociology of their producers, the question of European 
communication no longer appears as a mere phenomenon of discursive 
ballistics and comes into view as a universe of multiple and complex 
interactions. Multiple, firstly because the production and publicization 
of information on EU activities as well as the interpretations they 
generate, are the products of the activities of a wide range of actors; 
and most notably of the agents of EU institutions: policy makers and 
their staff, the administrative personnel in charge of communication (in 
Parliament, within the Commission, the Council, and Member States); 
but also, and increasingly, of private producers of information, 
discourses and analysis on Europe: journalists, activists of political 
parties and movements, interest groups, think tanks, and so on. They 
are complex, too, in that the interactions between ‘producers’, 
‘developers’ and ‘reporters’ of European news can not be reduced to 
purely functional (and sometimes dysfunctional) relationships aimed at 
informing the public on the ‘sensitive and significant’ facts, to use an 
expression borrowed from Molotch and Lester (1981). Indeed, these 
relationships are caught in tensions and competitions of various kinds. 
In order to gain insight into this world of European information co-
production, we aim in this chapter to examine the historical and 
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sociological process structuring a relational and transactional space 
governed jointly by producers, go-betweens, and mediators of 
European information, or to put it more simply, to do the sociology of 
the world of the professionals of the ‘EU public sphere’. To make 
sense of the organization of these transactional games, we will proceed 
in three stages. We first focus on the agents of the Commission - 
including the DG COMM13,who, today as in the past, are in charge of 
organizing European information, and whose practices as well as 
discourses convey traces of the organizational sedimentation of EU 
bureaucracy (Pierson, 1996). We will in particular examine the origins 
of the organizational stigma attached to these agents. Keeping a 
historical perspective, we will then seek to re-situate the information-
communication activities at the heart of the institutional and political 
tensions characterizing a Europe under construction, this time placing 
more emphasis on jurisdictional disputes, hierarchical issues and the political 
heteronomy that impact the manufacturing of European information. 
Finally, we will study the more contemporary transformations this field 
has undergone, through the changes in the division of labor, the 
reallocation of resources14 and the reconfiguration of the relations 
between civil servants, journalists, consultants and experts. Our analys 
will be structured around pairs of oppositions such as administrative-
political, independence-interdependence, autonomy-heteronomy, 
permanence-intermittence, hierarchy-fragmentation. The aim of this 
method of analysis is not to distinguish between different types of 
information producers, but to uncover the tensions and the logics that 
make them belong to the same world whose morphology is shaped by 
an institutionalized system of co-production and is the place from 
which European affairs are being increasingly managed. 
                                                             
13 By convention, we shall use the current name – DG COMM – to generically designate the 
European Commission's Directorate General for Communication. Its previous names (DG 
X between 1967 and 1999; DG Press between 2000 and 2005) will only be used in 
reference to their precise historical context. 
14 The term is not used here in its utilitarian sense. As noted by J. Lagroye, the ‘notion of 
resources only makes sense relationally and relatively: relationally because a resource is 
what we have that our adversary does not; relatively because a quality or social position is 
only a resource according to the hierarchy of the qualities and positions recognized by the 
group’ (Lagroye, 2002, p.261). 
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‘INFORMATION PEOPLE’ 
IN THE EC/EU BUREAUCRACY 
 
Decisions concerning the distribution of information-related tasks 
made in the 1950s, have had instituting and institutionalizing effects on 
the organization of this sector of activity, particularly in terms of 
hierarchies, monopolies and resources. Although, objectively speaking, 
they cannot be proved or disproved, the founding myths that inhabit 
social organizations bring to the surface discourses on the historical 
foundations and structural mechanisms underpinning the principles of 
classification of contemporary positions. Like any institution, the EU 
bureaucracy has its own founding myths of the ‘European adventure’, 
with its cohorts of ‘crusaders’ and ‘pioneers’. Such myths are a useful 
entry point for analyzing the morphology of the positional and 
relational space in which the agents of EU communication, their know-
how and reputation evolve and are perceived. Thus, the reputation that 
‘information people’ acquired within the Commission early on provides 
the first tangible indications on the objective and structural reasons 
underlying the internalized principles of hierarchization that continue to this 
day to guide the EU administration. In opposition to a strategic analysis 
of ‘European Communication’, our study reveals that the world of EU 
information specialists is divided or from the ontset and offers uneven 
legitimacy resources depending on the actors' mandate and scope of 
action. 
 
‘The DG of the good-for-nothings’ 
The way it is told by its past and present protagonists, the history of 
European information agents is nonetheless a golden legend that 
mirrors the golden legend of the corps of European civil servants based 
on the memoires of its ‘founders’ (Dumoulin, 2007). The intrigue of 
this story is always the same and makes use of the same idealized 
narrative figures. First, there were uncertain beginnings during which a 
small team of committed ‘adventurers’, galvanized by their faith in 
Europe, and backed and managed by a handful of courageous and 
rebellious ‘captains’, advanced despite political resistance and 
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scepticism. Then, with the success of the integration process, the 
service started to grow and to lose its pioneering charm but earned its 
stripes as a professional corps within the EU administration. This 
replacement of activism by bureaucratic specialization, and of the 
‘forefathers’ genius with the professionalism of the highly qualified 
graduates of EU competitive examinations is accepted as a natural 
evolution. But there is more, or rather something else, in the etiological 
myth of the institutional communicators. In the testimonies that they 
readily give to observers, all the actors who were involved in the early 
years of the European adventure in communication recall their 
reputation as ‘entertainers’ within the nascent administration. In these 
narratives, the EU civil servants assigned to information missions are 
depicted as having suffered more, and for longer, than other agents, 
from a reputation of amateurism15. Traditionally, the DG COMM has 
had the reputation (an unenviable one in a corps known for its high 
qualification level) as the ‘DG of the good-for-nothings’, of the ‘poets’. 
In an institutional field celebrating technical, legal or economic skills, 
the poet or entertainer is seen as involved in literary and otherwise 
futile tasks. 
‘The personnel of the communication department are always seen as 
thoughtless hippies. We, at DG COMM, have a bit of a reputation for being 
the DG of the good-for-nothings ... It's partly true ... though we don't always 
mess up everything! Not all of us in any case [laughs]. This is partly true, 
especially because the other DGs tend to not take us seriously. This does 
have effects. The up-and-comers and outstanding civil servants generally 
want to be recruited in the Secretariat-General or in the DG Competition, 
not with us.’ (Interview with agent who spent his ten year career in the DG 
COMM (first in Brussels and then in the Commission representation in a 
Member State), February 2008). 
One is so repeatedly reminded of this disqualification in discussions 
within the Commission, both in the in-group (DG COMM agents) and 
the out-group (agents of the other DGs), that one can consider it as 
part of the indigenous objectification of the symbolic order of the DGs 
and, more broadly, as an element of the symbolic hierarchy of the space 
of the EU administration's positions and jobs. This depreciation is 
confirmed by the political value Commissioners traditionally attach to 
DG COMM, but also by the structural analysis of the differential 
desirability of positions within the Commission administration. With 
respect to the low political ‘value’ of the DG COMM, it must be noted 
                                                             
15 The ‘pioneers’ surrounding Jean Monnet at the ECSC perceived themselves and called 
themselves the ‘missionaries’ of Europe (Rabier, 1993, p. 25). 
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that the information and communication portfolio has systematically 
been allocated to Commissioners as a secondary portfolio (see 
Appendix 1). In their survey on European Commissioners, J. Joana and 
A. Smith talk about the poor image that sticks to DG COMM in the 
successive Colleges, and illustrate their analysis with anecdotes and 
testimonies of Commissioners and their cabinet members that leave no 
ambiguity (Joana, Smith, 2002, p. 76, p. 177). They go so far as to claim 
that ‘between 1958 and 1999, the overall responsibility for information 
within the Commission was always seen as an unrewarding portfolio for 
a Commissioner and a thankless task for the DG X’ (Joana, Smith, 
2002, p. 193). Concerning the low level of benefits gained from a 
position in DG COMM in terms of career promotion, the study of 
high-ranking European officials conducted by M. De Lassalle and D. 
Georgakakis highlights that the career-boosting effects of working in 
certain DGs such as the DG Administration and the DG COMM, are 
more limited than in those of the big ‘historical’ DGs (Competition, 
Internal Market, for instance) or cabinets (Stevens, 2001). For this 
reason, the DGs that provide little European institutional capital 
(Georgakakis, De Lassalle, 2007b) have low relative value in 
comparison with the DGs that ambitious elite agents aspire to serve. 
The low political value of the DG COMM and the low prestige of 
administrative positions, combine and reinforce each other. The lack of 
a ‘heavyweight’ Commissioner or of a Commissioner truly dedicated to 
communication issues results in a shortage of important missions and 
major challenges, and consequently a lack of opportunities for agents to 
be spotted as good candidates for positions in a cabinet, which is the 
most effective career-booster. 
 
The ‘genetic’ reasons for the stigma 
The tensions that accompanied the creation of the Joint Press and 
Information Service (1958-1961), the frequent name changes (DG X, DG 
PRESS, DG COMM), the elimination of the DG from the 
Commission's organizational structure between 1999 and 2001, the 
conflictual relationships with other services (the Spokesperson service, 
DG III16), were all symptomatic of the contingent nature of the 
administrative and political issues that affect this Directorate, and 
                                                             
16 In the late 1980s, DG X and DG Internal market waged a fierce turf war over the 
‘audiovisual policy’ portfolio (see below). 
  11 
therefore its weak attractiveness in terms of career prospects. But 
among the reasons that historically explain the stigma, the first lies in 
the way information and communication missions were distributed at 
the time of the establishment of the Communities. Following the model 
of the administrative structure implemented by Jean Monnet in 1952 
for the High Authority of the ECSC, the executive heads of the EEC 
and Euratom appointed a Spokesperson to inform and liaise with the 
press. 
These Spokespersons act as press officers. Their main functions consist 
in writing press releases, conducting briefings, holding press 
conferences and ensuring close contact with journalists. In this 
organizational rationale, the Spokesperson is literally the link between 
the cabinet and the outside world: their functions are therefore political 
and in no way administrative. Indeed, though the frontier between the 
political (the cabinet) and the administrative is often fuzzy in the daily 
work of the institutions, one can still identify a general distinction: the 
political is what is ‘sensitive’ in the political arena (Weber, 2003, p. 119). 
Sensitivity, defined not materially but relationally and contextually, can 
therefore be measured by the degree of (potential or actual) interest it 
receives from the players in the political game, the press, the mass 
media and therefore, possibly, public opinion. In this perspective, the 
job of the Spokesperson of EU executives is sensitive, and 
consequently explicitly political. This is why, as early as the 1950s, they 
were considered as informal members of cabinet of the heads of the 
three Communities (Bastin, 2003, p. 265). But, in order to inform the 
groups affected by Community decisions and activities, the 
Spokespersons need staff to write brochures and summary sheets; they 
need personnel to ensure that EU-related information is disseminated 
to the Member States. This task – which is more administrative in 
nature as it is more technical and less sensitive to current events – 
cannot be carried out by the Spokespersons. 
On the initiative of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Communities, a Joint Press and Information Service (PIS) of the European 
Communities17 was created in the early 1960s. The work of the PIS 
focused on ‘specific audiences’, that is to say groups who were either 
directly concerned by EU decisions (economic policy makers, farmers, 
                                                             
17 Faced with a void in communication with regard to the development and decisions made 
by the Communities, MEPs adopted a resolution in June 1958 advocating the creation of a 
Joint Press and Information Service. Official Journal, July 26 1958. 
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trade unionists), or were intended to relays of a positive image of 
European integration to a wider audience, and particularly the youth 
(teachers and academics, for example). Communication by the PIS was 
clearly distinct from the work of the Spokespersons in that it was 
directed primarily to audiovisual media services and came in the form 
of various publications or information disseminated at trade shows and 
exhibitions in Member States and abroad. Thus, since the early 1960s, a 
principle of division of tasks within the European institutions 
crystallized: the PIS produces pamphlets on EU activities and maintains 
‘public relations’ with specific groups while the Spokesperson explains 
the positions of the Commission on sensitive and important issues. 
 
 
Textbox 1: The div is ion o f  in formation-re lated tasks 
within the Commiss ion 
In a comminatory internal service note, Giuseppe Caron, Vice-President of 
the Commission in charge of information, describes the respective tasks of 
the Spokesman's Group and of the PIS. 
‘Following an agreement reached on March 1 1960 between the presidents of 
the three Executive bodies, and the decisions made by each Executive, the 
spokesman Groups shall, from January 1 1961, report for all matters to the 
Executive Body they are attached to, and no longer to the Joint Press and 
Information Service. Furthermore, the Commission also approved, during its 
114th meeting held on July 27 1960, a definition of the tasks as well as of the 
structure of its own spokesman's Group, as shown below: 
A. the Commission's spokesman's Group 
The Spokesperson must primarily follow in detail the daily activities of the 
Commission and be able to interpret its politics at all times. The action of 
information s/he performs is therefore a short-term, rapid and official one. 
The task of the Spokespersons Group is one of general rather than technical 
information... 
B. Joint Press and Information Service of the European Communities 
The Press and Information Service Executives is common to the executives 
of the three European Communities. [...] The task of the Service is to ensure 
information in the long run [...]. In conclusion, I ask that, in compliance with 
the decisions made by the Commission, the services conduct their relations 
with the press only through the intermediary of the spokesman's group.’ 
Excerpts from an internal note ‘Tasks and Functions of the Commission' 
spokesman's Group and coordination of its activities with those of the Joint 
Press and Information Service of the European Communities.’ February 
1961, CEAB 2/2930. 
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Sociologically, this functional distribution of communication-related 
tasks can be interpreted as an implicit distinction between the noble 
tasks and the thankless ones, defined in terms of skills (verbal dexterity, 
political sense, a thorough understanding of technical issues and 
political affairs...) and of partners routinely involved in each profession. 
In this regard, Sociology has shown the effects of this principle of the 
division of labor on representations of the relative prestige of 
professional groups, with the formation of an elite group whose 
members are deemed pretentious by the other groups in the same 
professional environment, groups who, for their part, are associated 
with more menial tasks (Hughes, 1996). Transposing this framework of 
professional hierarchies to our context reveals the elitist nature of 
functions assigned to the Spokespersons (working directly with their 
Commissioner at the heart of the political game or being on the front 
line with journalists in the newsroom) and, by contrast, the subordinate 
and less prestigious position of the PIS staff who write pamphlets, 
prepare press reviews and spread the European message in public 
events. 
 
 
THE PARADOXICAL MANAGEMENT 
OF EU INFORMATION-COMMUNICATION 
 
The institutionalization of this original division of information-
communication tasks partly explains its sensitivity to conflicts opposing 
the directorates of the Commission but also to the tensions between 
the Commission, Parliament and national governments. We shall see 
now that the institutionalization of the Spokesperson was not the only 
obstacle to the efforts made by the DG COMM agents to impose it as 
the EU's administrative center for information and communication 
activities. The specialized services of the other DGs and EU 
institutions have also contributed to fragmenting communication 
related work, just as differences between the leaders of a European 
political arena have been transformed by the deepening process of 
integration and the entry of the new Member States. 
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Institutionalizing fragmentation 
At the time of the merger of the executive bodies, the ‘inter-executive’ 
structure (1965-1967) responsible for reorganizing the services chose to 
redefine the hierarchy of the functions for the agents in charge of 
relations with the press and public opinion. Thus, the PIS became a 
Directorate General (DG X) of the unified Commission. In the 
meantime, a unique Spokesperson Service was created and prolonged 
the Spokesperson Group in place since 1958 within the EEC. The 
relations with the press were therefore officially split into two distinct 
areas: the Spokesperson Service, headed by Bino Olivi, was in charge of 
the accredited press in Brussels. DG X managed relations with the non-
accredited press, therefore mostly with the regional press of the 
Member States. This functional and territorial division fostered lasting 
rivalry, embodied in the opposition between the leaders of the DG X 
and those of the SPS; an opposition which its own protagonists J.-R. 
Rabier and B. Olivi, turned into a legend and which has made the 
reconciliation of the two services impossible18. 
 
 
Textbox 2: Nothing personal . . .  
The dispute between J.-R Rabier and B. Olivi symbolize the tensions between 
Spokespersons and the communicators in the EU bureaucracy. 
J. R. Rabier, a former French civil servant at the Plan Commission, joined 
Jean Monnet in Luxembourg in 1954 and became Chief of Staff of the 
President of the ECSC High Authority. In 1960, this Catholic personalist and 
graduate in Political science was appointed Director-General of the PIS and 
remained at this post until the PIS became DG X in 1967. He was re-
appointed Director-General of the DG X in 1970 but was replaced by a high 
ranking Irish official when the Directorate was expanded in 1973. 
B. Olivi was an Italian civil servant and law graduate appointed in 1960 to 
work with Commissioner Giuseppe Caron (whose mandate included 
information) as Deputy Head of Cabinet. When, in 1962, a new EEC 
Commission Spokesperson was to be appointed, Caron recommended his 
                                                             
18 The SPS and DG X were headed by the same person only three times: R. Ruggiero (1977-
1982) led both services after President Jenkins merged the SPS into the DG X; J. Faull 
(2001) carried out this double responsibility during the transitional period of recreation of 
the DG X by President Prodi; C. Le Bail was head of the SPS and Director-General of the 
DG COMM during the long process of development of the DG's organizational chart 
(November 2004 to November 2005) during the installation of the Barroso Commission. 
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collaborator. Olivi held this position until 1977 and implemented the 
Commission Press Room system based on the accreditation mechanism, the 
‘Midday Express’ and a ‘code’ for the relations between the Commission and 
the press (see below). 
In interviews with a team of historians led by Michel Dumoulin, Rabier, Olivi 
and also some of their former collaborators (Paul Collowald, Colette Le Bail, 
Max Konsthamm Manuel Santarelli) described at length the various episodes 
of the dual (Oral History Project, the Historical Archives of the EU, 
European University Institute, Florence). About the respective profiles of the 
two heads of EU information affairs and their relationship in the 1960s, M. 
Santarelli volunteered the following interpretation: ‘There were power 
struggles [...] but never any personal rivalry between them: they had different 
views on what needed to be done, not about the goal of European action, but 
about the means of achieving it. Rabier was certainly much more engaged, in 
a radical federalist manner; whereas Olivi, who was a federalist as well as a 
loyal follower of Spinelli, was less dogmatic and more convinced of the 
necessity of taking into account national realities and was more wary of the 
risks for Europe of a rushed supra-nationality.’ 
 
 
The hierarchy between the DG X agents and the Spokesperson is 
reinforced by the differential relationship to institutional constraints 
and career prospects. More than one out of two Spokespersons are 
former journalists who were personally hired by Commissioners (Joana, 
Smith, 2002) whereas the majority of the DG X agents are civil servants 
with, in general high longevity in this Directorate General, in which 
promotions are rare because there is little turnover among directors and 
heads of units (see below). With regard to the ‘information people’, it 
should be noted that the specialization and professionalism the 
institution attributes - both objectively and subjectively – solely to the 
Spokespersons, rest primarily on the internalization of skills acquired in 
fields of activities (mostly journalism) that lie outside European 
institutions. 
 
The relative centrality of the central services 
Though the influence of a DG in the EU space is subjectively measured 
through its reputation, it can, as we have seen, be objectively evaluated 
using a number of indicators such as the political value it gives a 
Commissioner's portfolio or the amount of European institutional 
capital it confers upon its staff. It can also be measured more directly 
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through its ability to impose its functions, the amount of human and 
financial resources it is allocated or the quality or even the power of 
external protagonist who support it19. If DG COMM has performed 
the statutory role of a ‘central service’ at the Berlaymont or in the 
Commission's representations in the Member States20, its capacity to 
coordinate EU communication activities has traditionally been 
restricted. Indeed, ever since the EU administrative mechanisms were 
implemented, a number of communication agents and services have 
escaped centralization. It is the case, as we have seen, of Spokespersons 
who serve as press officers to the various Commissioners, directly 
manage their relations with the correspondents accredited in Brussels, 
and report directly to the President of the Commission (the head 
Spokesman is the President's Spokesperson). This is also the case of the 
communication service staff of each DG whose numbers started to 
increase in the late 1960s. Their role is to manage, for each DG, their 
own circuits of public relations with professional groups and national 
administrations. It is, finally, the case of the press services and 
communication personnel of the other European institutions, such as 
the Parliament's DG-Press or the Communications Department of the 
ECB. 
Quantitatively, the number of personnel working for DG COMM 
increased rapidly. The hundred or so civil servants who moved from 
the PIS to the DG X, rapidly increased to two hundred agents. In 1972, 
a parliamentary report indicated 215 civil servants and 71 ‘other agents’. 
Today, almost one thousand staff work for DG COMM21, which is 
more than the average number of agents per DG (around 600). But this 
figure needs to be put into perspective by taking into account the 
situation in other DGs: Over 1,000 agents in DG Agriculture, Energy, 
                                                             
19 The ‘coalitions of causes’, partly reinforced by support from outside the institutions, have 
non negligible effects on the frameworks of public policies and the nature of their 
instruments (Sabatier, 1998). 
20 The staff in the Commission's representations located in the capital cities of the Member 
States are placed under the authority of DG COMM. These decentralized services used to 
be called press and information external offices. J. Delors wished to change their name and 
give them a more diplomatic function, hence the reform. 
21 This figure is based on the Commission's organizational charts of 2008 and indicates that 
there has been a slight rise since the 1990s. In 1997-1998, an internal survey by the 
Commision estimated that the staff serving information-communication related functions 
was equivalent to 935 person/years. See DECODE report (DEcoder la COmmission de 
Demain), 1998. The latest ‘Human Resources Report’ (2009) indicates that 1023 staff are 
allocated to ‘information, communication and publication’ tasks, representing 3 per cent of 
the Commission's employees. 
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Transport, Business and Industry and around 2,000 in DG Research. 
The figure becomes even less impressive when one takes into account 
the fact that ninety of these agents report to the Spokesperson Service 
and that over five hundred work in the Representations in the Member 
States. Furthermore, the communication services of some DGs are 
substantial. In the ‘historic’ DGs, we can observe the presence of 
sizeable teams structured into true communication services. A good 
illustration is Unit R4 for Communication and Information in DG ECFIN 
which employs 25 agents, or Unit 1 of DG Competition which 
comprises sixteen agents, or Unit A4 for internal and external 
communication of DG Internal Market and Services, numbering over 
30 agents. 
These communication services have no hierarchical relationship with 
DG COMM. They are allocated their own budgets and operate under 
the authority of their Director-General, who, in turn reports to the 
Commissioner in charge of the DG. Thus, the campaign for the launch 
of the Euro in 2002, which, as a result of its success, has become a 
benchmark campaign for the Commission, was initiated and managed 
by the Commissioner for Economic, Monetary and Financial affairs, 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy, with the support of its own communication 
services22. But this type of communication work is in no way limited to 
such high profile and ‘general public’ campaigns unanimously backed 
by all EU institutions. It is mostly used as an instrument in power 
relationship between the services or institutions, as is illustrated by the 
following interview extract. 
In the Commission, as in most DGs, there wasn't a highly developed 
communication culture. For the line managers of my generation (28 
years seniority in the Commission), communication was kind of an 
obscure issue, an additional problem. We were concerned about votes 
in Parliament and in the Council. There are several reasons for this. The 
first is we didn't need to do any marketing: the interest is ipso facto 
self-evident. And for us, there was the Big Bang of the internal market 
completion. Without much professionalism, with little resources, we 
started doing communication work. But our problem is not only 
communication with businesses. It's not structured clearly enough but it 
does exist. It always has. The problem is that when a service prepares 
an action or a policy, we know that each institution is going to look 
                                                             
22 The commission allocated over 200 million € per year for this campaign in 1998 and 1999. 
ECFIN/R/4/2002/04 report, (July) 2003. 
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after its own interest. We know now that we need to win over public 
opinion and the media to be able to win the inter-institutional battle. 
The political generates too much disturbance. Look at the Bolkenstein 
directive initially ... and how it ended up. Same thing with the new 
public procurement directives. A few hundred amendments were made 
and some are contradictory. That's the problem. In its infinite wisdom 
[smile] Parliament is capable of voting for everything and its opposite. 
There's been a drift among the politicians who play the technocrat. And 
if we, of all people, don't communicate, we'll lose the battle. (Interview 
with a top civil servant of DG Internal market and services, November 
2007) 
For this reason, the Commission's (mostly operational) competence to 
govern communication is a politically sensitive issue that recurrently 
arises between the main institutions of the EU - whether it is deemed 
responsible for its failures or suspected by MEPs or national 
governments of spreading its own message – ‘propaganda’ – directly to 
the publics of the Member States. In this perspective, the position and 
legitimacy of the DG COMM's agents within the world of EU 
communication vary according to the political circumstances and are 
subject to the influence of the Commission in inter-institutional 
relations. Just as we observe differences in statutes, missions and 
symbolic positions between the Spokespersons (appointed by the 
Commissioners and assigned to politically sensitive missions) and the 
DG COMM's agents (most of whom are civil servants performing 
more ‘invisible’ tasks), we also notice a certain correlation between the 
profile and relative permanence of this DG's Directors-General and the 
degree of conflictuality between EU institutions. 
Since the creation of DG X in 1967, fourteen Directors-General have 
succeeded each other. If they all share the characteristics of an 
internationalized elite (postgraduate degrees, experience abroad, 
multilingual), a longitudinal examination of their respective careers 
reveals two distinct profiles: 1) political collaborators, often high 
ranking civil servants in their country (jurists or diplomats), engaged in 
politics, who have served in the cabinets of European Commissioners 
or ministers. These are intermittent agents of the EU administration 
community. The time they spend serving the EU – under five years on 
average - is related to that of the political leaders they work for; 2) the 
‘servants of Europe’, who have the status of EU civil servants and have 
seldom worked in a cabinet and have worked their way up the ranks. 
These are permanent agents of the EU (over twenty years of service on 
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average) and spend a longer time at the helm of the DG COMM (over 
five years) than their ‘political’ counterparts. The presence of the 
political collaborators at the head of the DG COMM corresponds to 
periods of high political heteronomy in the EU information and 
communication apparatus (see Appendix 1). 
But this political heteronomy must not overshadow the equally 
profound changes related to the emergence of a veritable market of 
expertise in the field of European information and discourse. Indeed, 
from the late 1980s onwards, one can observe a change in the 
economics and the division of labor in the sector, resulting in changes 
in the principles of co-production and therefore in the interactions 
between the intra-institutional professionals (DG COMM agents, 
Spokespersons, specialists of other DGs) and extra-institutional agents. 
The emergence of new professions in the field of EU information 
(communication agencies, think tanks and specialized internet web 
sites) coincided with the assertive development of a space of activity, 
which remained highly heteronymous but became based on a 
rationalisation and a greater recognition of specific skills. 
 
 
THE FIELD 
OF INFORMATION PROFESSIONALS 
 
Though the mediocre results recorded by many indicators23 have led to 
widespread criticism of the EU's information policy, these debates 
mask more structural changes in the relations between ‘rival partners’ in 
the production of communication. The production of content, analysis, 
advice and even criticisms about the EU information-communication 
policy has turned into a market in which positions of recognized 
experts and contracts can be acquired, and in which professional 
strategies, economic enterprises and individual careers are developing. 
In theory, the division of labor between the specialized personnel of 
public institutions and political journalists is clear-cut, but in practice, 
the frontiers are fuzzy (Accardo, 1995). In addition to the socialization 
                                                             
23 The recognized indicators of efficiency of communication policy are, among others, the level of electoral 
mobilization or support expressed by citizens and the intensity of media coverage of EU affairs. 
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effects generated by the transactional relations characterizing this 
professional activity, an examination of careers in the ‘world of 
European information’ (Bastin, 2003) reveals that the frontiers are 
extremely porous. News agencies, consultants and polling agencies 
work permanently and, in some cases exclusively, with EU institutions. 
Some go on to employment in European institutions (Bastin, 2003, p. 
258), while former EU staff members can be found in private 
organizations specializing in European affairs. This process reveals a 
diversification of the professions and careers around EU information. 
But it is even more revealing of the intense circulation of the same 
cognitive and relational resources within a field of activity whose 
borders (which extend beyond the institutional boundaries of the EU) 
and rules have stabilized around two contiguous, but symbolically 
differentiated areas of professional practice. The first is content 
production, for the most part subcontractied and the second is strategic 
analysis, generally offered by specialized organizations claiming to 
contribute to the production of frameworks of perception, 
interpretation and transformation of the European communication 
‘problem’. 
 
Being a journalist in Brussels : towards the normalization of a 
profession 
Ever since the early years of European integration, journalists were 
enrolled in various capacities in EU information politics, initially as 
‘defectors’. At the head of the ECSC, J. Monnet surrounded himself 
with journalists like Paul Collowald (former correspondent of Le Monde 
in Strasbourg) or François Duchêne (former correspondent of the 
Manchester Guardian in Paris), to infuse professional practices and 
known-how into press-relations. Most Spokespersons were recruited 
from the ranks of experienced journalists committed to the 
integrationist cause who drew closer to the entrepreneurs of Europe by 
reporting on their work (Collowald, 1993). Journalists were also 
enrolled as mediators in an on-going effort to inform the public about 
advances made in the integration process. The history of ‘Agence 
Europe’ (created in 1952 in Luxembourg, it was relocated to Brussels 
with the establishment of the EC) and the career of its emblematic 
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founder, Emanuele Gazzo24 show quite well the ‘pro-European’ leaning 
(Lelu, 2000) of the first press agencies established in Brussels - such as 
the Agra agency or Europe Information Service - and the importance 
of financial support from the Commission, taking the form of a self-
interested subscription policy. In return for a few dozen subscriptions, 
the agencies or national newspapers would send a permanent 
correspondent to Brussels. Finally, journalists served Europe as experts 
in editorial work as subcontractors or external collaborators. As part of 
its increasingly massive diffusion of information and communication 
materials (brochures, fact sheets, newsletters, studies and reports), the 
Commission thus started, from the late 1960s onwards, to increasingly 
resort to journalists working freelance. 
On a more statutory level, the implementation of an original and 
sophisticated accreditation system, co-managed with the professional 
association of international journalists in Brussels (see box below), 
created the conditions for the formation of a European press corps in 
Brussels. By bringing the news media to Brussels to report on a daily 
basis, the Commission also sought to impose its image of a center from 
which political impetus was created in the geographically fragmented 
(Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg and, more recently, Frankfurt) and 
technically complex political system. This integration of the European 
landscape by media companies from the various Member States 
resulted in the emergence of a new profession: the ‘European 
journalist’ in Brussels. The presence at the ‘Midday briefing’ of an 
increasing number of accredited journalists contributed to the gradual 
introduction of ‘news on Europe's current affairs’ (synonymous with 
EU political affairs) in major media. 
 
 
Textbox 3: Accredi ted journal is ts  at  the Ber laymont  
In the early 1960s, the Commission established rules governing access to the 
press room of the Berlaymont building (the Commission's headquarters) and 
turned the press briefings given by the Commissioners, or most often their 
Spokespersons, into daily briefings called the ‘Midday briefing’ or ‘Midday 
express’. Accreditation was co-managed by the Spokesmans Group (headed 
by B. Olivi from 1962 to 1977) and the International Press Association, 
                                                             
24 E. Gazzo was an Italian journalist sent to Luxembourg in the early years of the ECSC. In 
1952 he participated in the founding of the ‘International Information Europe' agency 
which later became Agence Europe. A staunch federalist, Gazzo enjoyed the Commission's 
support (in the form of subscriptions) for a long time. 
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representing the permanent correspondents in Brussels. What some have 
called the ‘Olivi system’ (Bastin, 2007) rests primarily on the ‘daily briefing’ 
concept but also on a number of advantages reserved for accredited 
journalists such as a temporary guarantee of exclusivity on information 
collected in the press room. In an interview with Gilles Bastin, B. Olivi 
justified the daily nature of the briefing in the following way: ‘Why? To give 
journalists as much as possible and to keep a bit of a hold on them, control 
them a little. Without that, they were scattered all over the house, there were 
rumours, leaks ... It was a way to serve journalists’ (Bastin, 2003, p.74). 
Following the same rationale, the Europe by Satellite programme (Television 
news service of the EU) has, since 1995, provided journalists with images, news 
items and audio-visual material. 
From 40 in 1963, the number of accredited journalists with access to the 
Berlaymont press room had increased to 1300 in 2005 before declining to just 
under 800 in 2010 according to the IPA (excluding audio-visual technicians). 
This recent decline indicates a rejection of the ‘propagandist’ methods of the 
Commission, which confuses information and communication. 
 
 
Several signs show that the unanimously integrationist spirit that 
characterized collaborations between information professionals across 
institutional boundaries in the 1950s and 60s, has today disappeared. 
The enlistment of journalists into the EU institutions, based on the 
European creed and selective affinities is fading. This trend is probably 
due to this creed having lost some of its mobilizing power, as much as 
to the normalization (or de-differentiation) of the sociological profiles, 
professional practices and ethics of the journalists25. The ‘Santer 
scandal’ in particular brutally revealed that the original rationales of 
collaboration or co-production between journalists and their 
informants at the Commission had lost their power. In some ways, the 
outraged reaction of the professional organizations of journalists in 
Brussels to the Commission's proposal to create its own press agency26 
                                                             
25 On the basis of a quantitative study of accredited ‘careers’, G. Bastin has observed a 
tendency towards a sociological as well as a professional standardization that began in 
1980s. He bases this analysis on the existence of the following combined phenomena: a 
standardization of the presentation of a professional card to access institutional spaces; the 
shortening of the average duration of the careers of accredited journalists in Brussels; the 
upward mobility of journalists in this career path; a decrease in the number of situations of 
pluriactivity. In connection with this development, he also noted a reduced capacity for 
self-regulate (Bastin, 2003). 
26 Proposition presented in the 2006 White Paper as a wish to ‘explore the desirability of having an inter-
institutional service operating on the basis of professional standards’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 10). 
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is revealing of the exhaustion of a system whereby European 
information was co-produced with the accredited press. 
 
 
Textbox 4: A codi f i cat ion o f  the «  on » and « o f f  »  
The ‘Santer scandal’ caused both sides to reflect on the relations between the 
Commission and the press. The agreement reached in 1995 between the IPA 
and the Spokespersons Group which was intended to provide a better 
regulatory framework for the relations between the two parties and a basis for 
the code of ethics of journalists reporting on the Commission's activity today 
serves to specify, in a novel way, the level of ‘officiality’ of exchanges 
between journalists and their informants: 
‘The status of statements made in the Press Room 
“On the record”: this information can be attributed to the Commission's 
Spokesperson by name. Everything is on-the-record unless otherwise 
specified; 
“Off the record”: The information may be attributed to “Commission 
sources”. Information will be given in the press room wherever possible. This 
obligation should not be regarded as an attempt to limit direct contact with 
the Spokesman's Service. It is intended to ensure that important information 
is not mentioned in the press room, but remains confined to small numbers 
of people with inside knowledge or to journalists specialising in certain areas. 
EBS transmission will be interrupted manually for “off-the-record” 
information. 
“Background”: The information is not attributable.’ 
Extract from the codification of the agreements between the Spokespersons 
Service of the European Commission (SPS) and the International Press 
Association (IPA). 
 
 
Media coverage of the EU has increased significantly over the last 
twenty years thanks, in particular, to the rising awareness of EU-related 
issues in political debates in the different Member States. But political 
Europe remains a fragmented political space. Its technical, complex and 
distant nature explains why it remains a peripheral subject in 
mainstream media which examine it through the prism of national 
issues (Schlesinger, 2003; Baisnée, Frinaut, 2007). What is more, the EU 
is virtually ignored by the primary news media of the majority of 
European citizens: television. The Commission has therefore made 
several attempts over the last twenty years to encourage better coverage 
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of EU activities such as the EbS, the EU portal, image banks, audio-
visual reports, and a European Radio Network. Though these initiatives 
have had limited effects due to the clear lack of public interest for the 
political life of the EU27, the explosion of the institutional production 
of media content has recently re-ignited the anger of accredited 
journalists. In February 2010, Frans Boogaard, Brussels correspondent 
of the Algemeen Dagblad and member of the Board of Directors of the 
API, published on the API website an article entitled ‘Brussels deserves 
its watchdogs’ in which he denounced the development of the 
communication strategy of the Commission: 
‘With the decreasing presence of journalists, the institutions are adopting an 
ever more aggressive Public Relations policy, with web-tv, which offers 
photos and interviews carried out by internal agents, for free. The 
Commission Representations abroad organize their own press conferences. 
And contrary to previous practice, almost all briefings, press conferences and 
public meetings can be followed on the internet. And though the 
correspondents naturally take full advantage of this – to cover Strasbourg 
from Brussels for example - the fact remains that some of the media believe 
that “Brussels” news can be followed from abroad; a belief that fails to see 
the importance of direct contacts, of experience in the European labyrinth 
acquired over time, and of the background information.’ (www.api-ipa.eu) 
This indignation, formulated in a rhetoric which is specifically 
professional (and therefore devoid of any pro-European creed) 
confirms, first of all, that a normalisation of the profession of 
international journalist in Brussels is taking place, and second, that a 
subcontracting sector specialized in the production of ‘European’ news 
content is emerging28. 
                                                             
27 This lack of interest has many reasons and explains why television operators avoid the 
topic of Europe (Baisnée, 2002). On the Euronews experience, see Baisnée, Marchetti, 
(2000). 
28 Examples of this include the Media Consulta Agency (whose Berlin-based parent agency 
has branches in all Member States) which produces editorial material for DG COMM and 
other DGs under a framework contract; the Brussels based Mostra agency (with partner 
agencies in twenty-five Member States), which has conducted several campaigns promoting 
European public policies (healthcare, fisheries, fight against discrimination) and produces 
the content of EuroparlTV, the European Parliament web television channel. 
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The economics of expertise in the field of European information 
Because of its decisional complexity, its physical distance, its reputation 
as an administrative and technical monster mired in its abstruse jargon, 
the EU has not yet taken concrete shape in the minds of the public 
(Gaxie, Hubé, Rowell, 2011), and remains a news topic that does ‘not 
sell well’ (Marchetti, 2003b). Paul Magnette talks of an ‘Orleanist’ public 
space (Magnette, 2003b) to express its limitation to the enlightened 
elites of Europe (Costa, Magnette, 2007). These conditions governing 
EU publicity are not foreign to the process of rationalization, which has 
gradually but profoundly transformed the European information 
economy. Economy must first of all be understood here in the broad 
sense as a heuristic metaphor designating the organized exchange of 
intangible goods on markets (places and techniques of exchange) 
involving participants with different roles (producers, brokers, buyers) 
and a system of rules and values. But we refer to economy in the 
stricter sense as well, meaning the transaction of products or services 
involving monetary exchanges. As mentioned before, journalists, called 
upon by the Commission to provide editorial services since the 1950s, 
created specialized enterprises to offer services tailored to the needs of 
the institution. Thus, agencies such as the European Research 
Associates (established in 1979) and later GPlus Europe (see box 
below) were founded by experienced specialists in European affairs: 
former accredited journalists, Spokespersons, former civil servants or 
collaborators who used their European and professional capital in 
consulting activities. They offer to Commission services their know-
how in strategic studies as well as in public relations and press relations. 
They also negotiate their knowledge of European institutions with 
lobbyists, private companies and international organizations that deal 
with the EU or wish to develop their activities in this market. 
 
 
Textbox 5: EU information markets  and careers 
Founded in 2000 by correspondents, former spokesman and senior staff of 
the Commission, the GPlus Europe consultancy agency describes itself as ‘an 
expert in the mechanisms, policies and actors of the EU.’ The firm's website 
places explicit emphasis on its internal knowledge of the EU machinery: ‘The 
impact of the European Union on the economic and political life - of Europe 
and the rest of the world - is constantly growing. However, its internal 
decision-making mechanisms often remain opaque. The GPlus team helps its 
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clients think through their entire approach to the EU and its Member States. 
And we help them make their voice heard.’(source: www.gpluseurope.com). 
Private clients include, Alstom, Walmart, Microsoft and Gazprom. 
The trajectory of Peter Guilford, co-founder (with journalist and producer 
Nigel Gardner) of this consultancy is quite emblematic of a specialization in 
European affairs based on circulations between EU institutions and the 
Brussels consulting scene. After covering European affairs for two decades as 
an accredited journalist working for The Times, he joined the Commission, and 
became Leon Brittan's Spokesman (Commissioner for Competition), then the 
media adviser to President Prodi. He left the Commission in 2000 to found 
GPlus, and was joined by other former Commission advisers and 
Spokespersons. His collaborators include Philippe Lemaître (former Brussels 
correspondent for Le Monde), Michael Tscherny (former journalist at Agence 
Europe), John Wyles (former Brussels correspondent for the Financial Times) 
and, recently, Bruno Dethomas (a former journalist at Le Monde, President 
Delors' spokesman at the late 1980s, and holder of several diplomatic 
functions for the EU). 
 
 
Through the creation and proliferation of such agencies, and with the 
development of specialized information websites (such as Euractiv), a 
process structuring a market of EU information expertise is taking 
place. The trajectories of the protagonists show that inside experience 
of EU institutions as well as relations with actors in the Commission 
constitute a highly sought after professional capital. The flourishing 
sector of EU public affairs consulting (in 2010, the Euractiv site 
estimated that there were 10,000 European public affairs consultants in 
Brussels) explicitly values experience in the Commission services as a 
foundation for a consulting career. These profiles are also highly prized 
among Brussels think tanks which, like the Center for European Policy 
Studies (founded in 1983) and more recently the European Policy 
Center (also based in Brussels), intend to influence European public 
policy. Though the work of think tanks present the more esoteric 
dimension of a highly specialized forward-looking activity with a 
strategic purpose, it competes with the agencies in Brussels that 
specialize in providing expert information to economic decision makers 
(the target of the EIS agency with its newsletter and now its Euro-
politics website), lobbyists and institutional circles. Thus, a market of 
strategic expertise on how to better approach EU policies and how to 
‘better communicate Europe’ has emerged. It is a market in which the 
functional distinctions between journalists, advisers, experts and 
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lobbyists disappear. The professional competences of those prescribers 
of perceptual and interpretive frameworks for public policies are 
convertible and are functional in public institutional spaces as well as in 
the private sector. The only thing that differentiates them is the nature 
of their clients. Thus, think tanks operate as very elitist spaces of 
brokerage and co-production of EU affairs expertise. 
 
 
Textbox 6: The smal l  wor ld o f  EU af fairs  consul tancy  
The Euractiv site perfectly symbolizes the convertibility of the positions and 
relationships within the field of Eurocracy. Founded in 1998 by a former 
Commission official and MEP, the Euractiv site has positioned itself as a 
portal ‘to all relevant documents and policy positions’ on EU affairs, 
‘shortening the time to find the right information for EU Actors.’ The site 
produces little content per se, but provides ‘LinksDossiers’ (a reasoned 
documentary database of web links) on key issues. Euractiv presents itself as 
‘an original business model, based on five elements (corporate sponsoring, 
EurActor membership, EU projects, advertising, and content syndication)’. It 
is sponsored in part by the EU Commission. In 2006, the Euractiv Foundation 
presented M. Wallström with its Yellow paper on EU communication policy 
entitled ‘Can EU hear me?’ (source: www. Euractive.com). 
Brussels think tanks illustrate the multipositionality of EU affairs experts. 
Combining economic decision makers, senior officials of national and 
international and academic institutions, they receive financial support from EU 
institutions, large international companies and private foundations. The Center 
for European Policy Studies is headed by the German economist Daniel Gros. 
Its supervisory board, chaired by Peter Sutherland (Goldman Sachs 
International), is composed of former high-ranking officials or Commissioners 
(Max Kohnstamm, Allan Larsson), journalists (Paul Gillespie, The Irish Times), 
and MEPs (Sylvie Goulard, Graham Watson), heads of consultancies (Philippe 
de Buck, BusinessEurope, John Wyles, GPlus), academics, representatives of 
other think tanks, NGOs and foundations. High-ranking officials, 
parliamentarians and Commissioners in office regularly attend seminars (see. 
www.ceps.eu) and breakfast briefings. 
 
 
The convertibility of skills and the (sequential or simultaneous) 
multipositionality of experts have fuelled concerns about the various 
influences shaping EU decision making. Following a Parliamentary 
resolution aimed at bringing greater transparency to the activities of 
lobbyists (Stubb report), the Commission adopted in May 2008 a ‘Code 
of Conduct for Interest Representatives’ establishing a voluntary 
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register which lobbyists working in Brussels are invited to join. The 
code defines ‘interest representation activities’ as those carried out with 
the aim to ‘inform and influence policy formulation and the decision-
making processes of the European institutions’. Let us note however 
that the activities conducted ‘in response to the Commission’s direct 
request, such as ad hoc or regular requests for factual information, data 
or expertise, invitations to public hearings, or participation in 
consultative committees or similar bodies' are explicitly exempt. 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 4). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Now at the end of our exploration of the professional worlds of EU 
information, we hope to have contributed a more sociological 
understanding of the European communication ‘problem’. Placing 
actors at the center of the investigation, analyzing trajectories, practices 
and interactions, and avoiding a teleological vision of ‘European 
construction’, has allowed us to examine the publicization of political 
Europe without entering into a normative discussion of its successes 
and failures. The processes we have studied are governed by a strategic, 
yet fragmented communication apparatus that disseminates messages to 
‘multiplier relays’ (media, opinion leaders, institutional partners, civil 
society). Although European issues and the institutional division of 
labor are still to some degree represented through the prism of the 
original conceptions and choices, the way European information is 
produced has changed. It is nowadays shaped by three overlapping 
trends. 
The first pertains to the introduction into the specialized services of the 
EU of skills and know-how typical of the professional sector of 
business communication. The dialectic between the outsourcing and in-
sourcing of skills has led to the gradual alignment of internal 
institutional practices with the methods of communication 
professionals. Identifying the ‘best stories’ in drafting fact-sheets by 
using the SWOT analysis tool used in marketing to evaluate the 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats involved in a 
product launch, writing a media impact report analyzing the outcome of 
a press release, an editorial or a Commissioner's visit to a region or 
setting up an agenda for a communication campaign, are all actions that 
are nowadays performed with the same tools and methods by EU 
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agents and their sub-contractors. This sharing of a common language 
and professional tools shows how much institutional culture has 
changed. Formerly considered as a tool to be implemented after the 
essential political work of the Commission, information-
communication is now built in from the onset and is seen as an 
essential component of the legitimacy of political action. The main 
indicator of this evolution has been the recent effort to professionalize 
the staff of DG COMM29 and rationalize the communication 
production chain within the institutions (advance planning, pooling 
instruments, and reinforcing inter-institutional coordination)30. 
The second trend, which prolongs the first, is related to the 
managerialization of the system of information co-production. 
European integration has always involved the enlistment of external 
experts and professionals in its different fields of activity (Robert, 
Vauchez, 2010). With regard to the services in charge of information 
and communication, these collaborations, based on elective affinities 
around the idea of integration and original protocols of the long term 
public relations programs such as the ‘Olivi system’, have brought some 
efficiency to the information system despite its functional 
fragmentation. This model has undergone a double rationalization in an 
effort to counteract the centripetal forces of a ‘multi-organization’ 
(Cram, 1994) such as the EU institutional system in which the existence 
of divergent sectoral interests and political visions inevitably leads to a 
fragmentation of the production of information. Initiatives undertaken 
in the aftermath of the failed referendums of 2005 and the 2006 White 
Paper have aimed to impose a more formalized and streamlined 
framework for inter-institutional discussion31. These efforts can be 
                                                             
29 One can cite for example the relation of additional specific positions in the Commission's 
Representations since 2005, the creation, in 2006-7 of a ‘communication master class’ or 
the implementation of the first competitive examination in communications in 2007-8. 
30 This is illustrated by a series of changes initiated by the Commission after June 2005, such 
as the re-shaping of the DG COMM's central organizational chart, the reinforcement of 
the communication teams in Brussels and in the Representations, the development of 
EuropeDirect and local information networks and relays, or the reshaping of the Europa 
portal. 
31 The rejection by the Parliament (EuropeanParliament, 2006) and the other representative 
bodies (EESC, 2006) of the proposals in the 2006 White Paper recommending the 
transformation of communication into a true common policy (European Commission, 
2006, p. 4) resulted in the strengthening of inter-agency coordination through the extension 
of the prerogatives of the Inter-Institutional Group on Information, or IGI (European 
Commission, 2007). The IGI is a joint body composed of the Communication directors of 
the Commission and the EP. Its original mandate was to define and coordinate the priority 
information actions for campaigns on enlargement and the launch of the Euro. 
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understood as an effort to generalize ‘best practices’ and principles of 
dialogue and not as an attempt to hierarchize information and 
communication functions. More procedural than organizational, the 
rationalization of this activity is therefore built around protocols 
through which the agents of the institution manage, in more 
depersonalized relationships, intermittent workers (freelance 
employees, contractual staff, interns) and external service providers 
executing tasks for the EU32. 
The third trend has to do with the standardization of how EU elites 
approach the ‘issue’ of the publicization of political Europe. 
Considered until recently as a problem of didactics (helping the public 
understand what the EU is about with the idea that the more citizens 
know about the EU, the more they will identify with it), it is now seen 
more as a problem (which anyone in power faces) of finding the 
balance between regulatory action and the necessity to legitimize its 
foundations, terms and objectives33. The succession of crises such as 
the ‘Santer scandal’, falling voter turnout, or the referendum failures 
have caused a shock (De Swaan, 2007). In an entirely new 
development, Commissioners today publicly comment on the EU's 
difficult relationship with citizens and on the need for a more 
participative communication policy. Following the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty, Heads of State and Government invited the 
Commission to manage a ‘period of reflection to enable a broad debate’ 
on the future of the EU (European Council, 2005). Commission agents 
began making more frequent appearances in their national public 
arenas. Commissioners have made their visits in the regions a 
systematic ritual. Behind the deliberative rhetoric and, beyond this 
multiplication of public appearances aimed at ‘giving Europe a human 
face’ (European Commission, 2006, p. 10), the public debate about EU 
action in the field of information and communication has become less 
sector specific and a more global issue linked to the theme of ‘good 
governance’. More than in the past, EU Communication has been 
perceived, described and criticized from the policy angle by journalists, 
think tanks, national political leaders, whether pro or anti-European. With 
                                                             
32 In terms of professional identity, we can note that in the absence of a recognized center or 
monopoly of expertise, civil servants assigned to these  tasks always define themselves in 
relation to the institutions they serve and not in relation to the missions, technical 
competency or practical activity that correspond to their function (Dubar, 1997). 
33 For more details on this classical tension which also opposes elites associated with 
regulatory work to the masses as recipients of the legitimation effort, (Jobert, Muller, 1987; 
Duchesne, Muller, 2003). 
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the installation in 2010, of the Barroso II Commission, DG COMM 
once again became a common operational service, and communication 
a secondary mandate for Vice-President Viviane Reding. Though those 
in power also owe their existence to their appropriation of information 
(Balandier, 1981), this exercise necessitates, in a democracy, many 
compromises so as not to appear as an attempt by the institutions of 
power to manipulate or monopolize political expression. The EU is 
today caught in the tension typical of modern democracies in that they 
have to develop strategies, means and tools to reduce uncertainty in a 
free, pluralistic, and sometimes oppositional public space (Negt, 2007), 
while avoiding accusations of distilling propaganda34. 
                                                             
34 I thank Didier Georgakakis for his meticulous reading of this text and for his comments 
and suggestions. 
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MANDATE OF THE PRESIDENTS AND THE 
COMMISSIONERS RESPONSIBLE FOR INFORMATION 
AND COMMUNICATION 
 
1958-1967 
PDT :Walter HALLSTEIN (Jan. 1958 – June 1967)  
Administration 
 
INFO-COM : Giuseppe CARON   
Vice President(Nov. 1959 - May 1963) 
Internal Market, Information (not explicitly 
mentioned in the mandate) 
 
Henri ROCHEREAU, Commissioner for Overseas 
Development (Ad interim between May 1963 and 
June 1964) 
 
INFO-COM : Guido COLONNA di PALIANO, Vice 
President  
Internal Market, Information (not explicitly 
mentioned in the mandate) 
 
1967-1970 
President: Jean REY (July 1967 – July 1970)  
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
 
INFO-COM : Albert COPPE, Commissioner for 
Budgets, Credit, Investment, Press and Information. 
 
 
 
 
 
1970-1973 
President : Franco Maria MALFATTI (July 1970 - March 
1972 
followed by Sicco MANSHOLT (=> Jan. 1973) 
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokespersons 
Group 
 
INFO-COM : Albert BORSCHETTE, Commissioner for 
Competition, Press and Information, Diffusion of 
information, Regional Policy 
 
1973-1977 
President: François-Xavier ORTOLI (Jan. 1973 – Jan. 
1977) 
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokespersons 
Group 
 
INFO-COM : Carlo SCARASCIA MUGNOZZA, Vice 
President 
Parliamentary Affairs, Environmental Policy, 
Protection of Consumer Interest, Transport, 
Information 
 
1977-1981 
President : Roy JENKINS (Jan. 1977 – Jan. 1981) 
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
Group, Information 
 
1981-1985 
President : Gaston THORN (Jan. 1981 – Jan. 1985)  
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
 
DIRECTORS-GENERAL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
1960, Creation of the EU Press and Information Service 
1960-1967, Jacques René RABIER* Responsible 
(*Former chief of cabinet for J. Monnet at the ECSC High Authority ) 
 
Jean POORTERMAN, EURATOM spokesperson 
Louis JANZ, ECSC spokesperson 
Giorgio SMOQUINA and later Bino OLIVI, EEC spokesperson (GPP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1967 –Merger of the Executives 
1967, creation of DG-X and of the Spokesperson Service 
Louis Janz*   
Director-General of the DG-X (* former ECSC spokesperson) 
1968-69, Karl Heinz NARJES**, Director-General of the DG-X 
(**form Chief of cabinet of W. Hallstein) 
B. OLIVI, Director of the Spokesperson Service 
P. COLLOWALD, Deputy Director of the Spokesperson Service 
 
 
 
 
1970-1973, Jacques René RABIER 
Director-General of the DG-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1973 – First enlargement 
1973-1976, Sean RONAN 
Director-General of the DG-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1976, Paul COLLOWALD 
Director-General of DG-X 
 
1977, President Jenkins merges the Spokesman's Service and DG-X 
 
 
1977,-1982 Renato RUGGIERO *** 
Director-General of DG-X 
(*** Spokesperson and later also Chief of Cabinet of President 
Jenkins) 
 
 
 
1982-1987,  Franz FROSCHMAIER 
Director-General of DG-X 
APPENDIX 1 
The political and bureaucratic distribution of positions in information-communication 
in the European Commission 
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Group, Culture, Security Office 
 
INFO-COM : Lorenzo NATALI, Vice-President 
Mediterranean Policy, Enlargement, Information 
 
 
 
1985-1989 
President : Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1985 – Dec. 1985 - 
Jan. 1989) 
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
Service, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, 
Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds 
 
INFO-COM : Carlo RIPA DE MEANA, Commissioner for     
Institutional Questions, People's Europe, Information 
and Communication Policy, Culture and Tourism. 
 
1989-1993 
President : Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1989 – Jan. 1993) 
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
Service, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service , 
Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds, 
Forward Studies Unit 
 
INFO-COM : Jean DONDELINGER, Commissioner for 
Audio-visual and Cultural Affairs, Information, 
People's Europe, Office for Official Publications 
 
1993-1995 
President : Jacques DELORS (Jan. 1993 – Jan. 1995)   
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Spokesperson 
Service, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service , 
Security Office, Monetary Matters, Structural Funds, 
Forward Studies Unit, Inspectorate-General, 
Competition 
 
INFO-COM : João de Deus PINHEIRO, Commissioner 
in charge of Relations with the European Parliament; 
Relations with the Member States on Transparency, 
Communication and Information; Culture and 
Audiovisual Policy; Office for Official Publications 
 
1995-1999 
President : Jacques SANTER (Jan. 1995 - March 1999)   
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Security Office, 
Forward Studies Unit, Inspectorate-General, Joint 
Interpreting and Conference Service , Spokesperson 
Service, Monetary matters (with de Silguy), Common 
Foreign and Security Policy with  Van den Broek), 
Institutional Questions for the  IGC (with Oreja) 
 
INFO-COM : Marcelino OREJA, Commissioner for 
Relations with the European Parliament; Relations 
with the Member States on Transparency, 
Communication and Information; Culture and 
Audiovisual policy; Office for Official Publications, 
Institutional Questions, Preparation for the 1996 IGC. 
 
 
1999-2004 
President : Romano PRODI (Sept. 1999 – Nov. 2004)  
Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Media and 
Communication (until 2001) followed by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987-1990, Manuel SANTARELLI 
Director-General of DG-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990-1997, Colette FLESCH 
Director-General of the DG-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997-1999, Spyros PAPPAS 
Director of the DG-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999-2000, FAULL is Spokesperson, Head of  Press and 
Communication  
2001, Jonathan FAULL    
Director  of DG-Press (Press and Communication) 
Spokesperson for President Prodi 
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Antonio Vitorino, Commission for  (2001-2004) 
Justice, Home Affairs and Communication 
 
 
 
2004-2009 
President José Manuel Durão Barroso (Nov. 2004 – 
Nov.  2009) 
 
INFO-COM : Margot WALLSTRÖM, first Vice-President, 
Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy 
 
 
 
Since 2009 
President José Manuel Durão Barroso (Nov. 2009 -) 
 
INFO-COM : Viviane Reding, Vice-president 
Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship 
 
2003, Jorge DE OLIVEIRA E SOUSA 
Director  of DG-Press 
 
 
2004, Colette LE BAIL 
Director  of DG-Press  
2005, Panayotis CARVOUNIS 
Director  of DG-Press 
2006-2011, Claus SORENSEN 
Director-General DG Communication  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2011-, G. PAULGER 
Director-General DG Communication 
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